State of Utah v. James L. Hatch and Della L. Hatch : Appellant\u27s Reply Brief by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1958
State of Utah v. James L. Hatch and Della L. Hatch :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister, Jr.; Dennis McCarthy; Counsel for Appellant;
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, State v. Hatch, No. 8937 (Utah Supreme Court, 1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3169
MW M• 
LINIVERSJTY UTAti 
J)£C 1 9 1958 
~ 
.~ ) ~aw~ ~ 
In the Supreme Co:irrof the · · , •. 
State of Utah 
------F t L E D 
AUG 2 81958 
Pl . t "jJ ----------------------·················-----... azn Z ;- ---Ci;;k, Supreme Court, Utah . 
vs. 
JAMES L. HATCH and 
DELLA L. HATCH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 8937 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE O,F UTAH 
DENNIS McCARTHY, Special Assistant 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE o~F UTAH 
Counsel for Appellant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CO·NTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ---------------------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS --------------------------------------------------- 3 
STATEMENT OF POINTS ------------------------------------------------------ 6, 7 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------· 7 
POINT I. SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD 
BY THE STATE OF UTAH IN TRUST 
IN ITS GOVERNMENTAL CAP A CITY _______ 7 
POINT II. THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A 
RESERVATION OF MINERALS -------------------- 10 
POINT III. UTAH LAW NECESSARILY CONTROLS 
THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 
STATE RELINQUISHED THE MINERALS 
IN ITS SCHOOL LANDS ------------------------------- 17 
POINT IV. THE EXCHANGE WAS ONE OF 
EQUIVALENTS ---------------------------------------------------- 21 
CON CL USI ON --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 3 
CASES CITED 
Alabama v. Schmidt 
2 3 2 U. S. 16 8, 3 4 S. Ct. 3 o 1 -------------------------------------------- 18 
Bridgforth v. Middleton, et al 
184 Miss. 6 3 2, 18 6 So. 8 3 7 ------------------------------------------- 15 
Cooper v. Roberts 
18 Howard 17 3 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 18 
Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Company 
167 Cal. 147, 13 8 Pac. 981 --------------------------------------------- 19 
Doolan v. Carr 
12 5 U. S. 618, 8 S. Ct. 12 2 8 ------------------------------------------- 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENT5-(Continue_d) 
Page 
Duchesne County, et al., v. State Tax Commission et al 
104 Utah 365, 372-383, 140 P. 2d 335, 338-343 ___ 9 
Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. Co. v. U. S. 
140 Fed. 2d 436 (CCA 9th, 1944)----- 21 
Newton v. State Board of Land Commissioners, et al 
37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053 ------------- 10, 15, 19 
Pioneer Investment & Trust Co. v. Board of Education 
35 Utah 1, 99 Pac. 150 ------------------- 10 
Price v. Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
267 U.S. 415, 45 Sup. Ct. 312 ___________ 10 
St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp 
104 U. S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875 _______ 10 
State of California v. Deseret Water, Oil and Irrigation Company 
243 U. S. 415, 37 S. Ct. 394 _____ 18 
State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial District 
51 N. M. 297, 183 P. 2d 607 10 
State v. George C. Stafford & Sons 
99 N. H. 92, 105 A. 2d 569, 573 10 
The Choctaw and Chicasaw Nations v. Wilmer D. Deay, et al 
235 Fed. 2d, 31 (CCA lOth, 1956) 21 
U. S. v. Champlin Refining Co., et al 
156 Fed. 2d 769 affirmed 331 U.S. 788, 67 S. Ct. 1346 _ 21 
United States v. Fox 
94 U. S. 315, 24 L. Ed. 192 --------------------------- 18 
U. S. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. 
318 U. S. 206, 63 S. Ct. 534 -------------------------- 21 
United States v. Sweet 
245 U. S. 563, 38 S. Ct. 193 22 
United States v. Nebo Oil Co. 
190 Fed. 2d 1003 (CCA 5th, 1951)------------------------- 21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Continued) 
Page 
Van Wagoner v. Whitmore 
58 Utah 418, 199 Pac. 670, 679 ---------------------------------- 9, 10 
Wyoming v. United States 
255 U. S. 489, 497, 41 S. Ct. 393 ------------------------------------ 15, 22 
Constitutional Provisions: 
Utah State Constitution, Article XX, Sec. 1 ---------------------------- 8 
Utah State Constitution, Article XX, Sees. 3, 5, 7 -------------------- 8 
Statutes: 
United States Code Annotated, Title 16, Sec. 485 6 
United States Code Annotated, Title 43, 
Sections 851, 852, 853 ------------------------------------------------ 4, 19, 22 
United States Revised Statutes, Sections 2275, 2276 ____________ 4 
Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, Section 6 5-1-14 ________________ 14, 15, 16 
Section 6 5 -1-15 ________________ 4, 5, 16, 2 3 
Section 65-1-27 ----------------------- 11, 12 
Section 6 5-1-7 0 ------------ 2, 11, 12, 13 
Utah Enabling Act, Section 6, 28 Stat. 107 ---------------------- 3, 7 
Section 10, 2 8 Stat. 107 ----------------------- 8 
Utah Revised Statutes, 1933, Section 86-1-58 ---------------------- 13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES L. HATCH and 
DELLA L. HATCH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 8937 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff, the State of Utah, commenced this suit 
in the District Court of Garfield County, State of Utah, 
to quiet title to mineral deposits in certain school lands, 
located within Section 2, Township 37 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian, Garfield County, State of 
Utah. Plaintiff's complaint seeks· to quiet title to the 
mineral rights in said land, and asserts no claim whatso-
ever to the surface rights. 
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Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim to 
said Complaint, which Answer denies generally the alle-
gations of the Complaint and affirmatively alleges that 
the mineral deposits in the said lands are owned by the 
defendants. Defendants' Counterclaim seeks to quiet title 
to the said minerals in the defendants. Plaintiff filed a 
reply to defendants' Counterclaim generally denying the 
allegations thereof. 
On June 4, 1958, the said action came on regularly 
for trial before the Honorable John L. Sevy, Jr., District 
Judge at the Courthouse in Richfield, Sevier County, 
Utah. It was stipulated by counsel that the matter could 
be tried and heard at Richfield. A written stipulation of 
facts, set forth at Page 11 of the transcript was entered 
into, executed by the counsel for the parties and filed 
at the commencement of the trial. Said stipulation estab-
lishes all of the factual questions relating to the said 
action with the exception of the question of whether the 
purported exchange by the State of Utah with the United 
States of America was made for the purpose of compact-
ing the holdings of the State of Utah pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 65-1-70, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. Evidence was introduced with respect to the latter 
question by plaintiff through the testimony of Mr. Don-
ald E. Prince, employee of the Utah State Land Board, 
which testimony is set forth commencing at page 29 of 
the transcript. 
On July 14, 1958, the District Court rendered a 
memorandum de.cision, set forth commencing at page 
14 of the transcript, holding in favor of the defendants 
and against the plaintiff. In said memorandum, the 
District Court candidly stated that, ccWith the limited 
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time and somewhat limited authorities at my command, 
I have tried to the best of my ability to grasp the signifi-
cance and meaning of the various points raised and to 
arrive at the proper decision." 
On July 22, 1958, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and a Judgment and Decree were entered in 
favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the Com-
plaint and Counterclaim. Plaintiff commenced this ap-
peal by Notice of Appeal filed on the 8th day of July, 
1958. 
STATEMENT O·F FACTS 
There is no dispute with respect to the facts. The 
complaint filed by the State of Utah asks for judgment 
quieting its title to the mineral deposits in certain lands 
located within Section 2, Township 37 South, Range 7 
West, Salt Lake Meridian. Title to both the surface rights 
and the mineral deposits of said lands is claimed by the 
defendants, James L. Hatch and his wife, Della L. Hatch. 
The lands involved, including the mineral deposits 
therein, were granted to the State of Utah for the sup-
port of its common schools by Section 6 of the Utah 
Enabling Act. Title thereto vested in the State of Utah, 
upon approval of survey, which took place prior to May 
24, 1897. Thereafter, on or about November 23, 1903, 
the United States purported to withdraw the described 
real property for a proposed forest reserve, which re-
serve is now known as the Dixie National Forest. The 
inclusion of the described property within the boundaries· 
of the forest reserve had no effect, however, upon the 
fee title of the State of Utah. 
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In September and October, 1925, the State Land 
Board of Utah made certain indemnity school land selec-
tions using the subject lands as base for an exchange 
of other lands located within the State. The selected 
lieu lands as well as the base lands exchanged are set forth 
in Selection Lists Nos. 2225 and 2226 (Exhibit uA" and 
Exhibit (CB"). Thereafter, on September 5, 1928, the 
selections and exchange were approved by the United States 
by what is known as Approved List No. 156 (Exhibit 
ccc") . The said selection and exchange purportedly were 
made pursuant to the provisions of Sections 2275 and 227 6, 
United States Revised Statutes, as amended, and made 
applicable to the State of Utah by the Act of Congress 
of May 3, 1902, which statutes are designated as Sections 
851, 852, and 853, Title 43, United States Code. 
At the time the purported selections and exchange 
were made, there was in full force and effect a State 
statute enacted on March 13, 1919, effective May 12, 
1919-, and presently known and designated as Section 65-
1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The statute provides 
as follows: 
((65-1-15. Coal and mineral deposits reserved-
Exceptions-Sales on royalty basis.-All coal and 
other mineral deposited in lands belonging to the 
state of Utah are hereby reserved to the state. 
Such deposits are reserved from sale, except on a 
rental and royalty basis as herein provided, and 
the purchaser of any lands belonging to the state 
shall acquire no right, title or interest in or to 
such deposits, but the rights of such purchaser 
shall be subject to the reservation of all coal and 
other mineral deposits, and to the conditions and 
limitations prescribed by law providing for the 
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5 
state and persons authorized by it to prospect or 
mine, and to remove such deposits, and to occupy 
and use so much of the surface of said lands as 
may be required for all purposes reasonably inci-
dent to the mining and removal of such deposits 
therefrom; provided that improved farm lands 
acquired by the state through foreclosure proceed-
ings or improved farm lands conveyed to the state 
by deed in satisfaction of farm loan mortgages 
may be sold by the state without mineral reserva-
tions. Salts and other minerals in the waters of 
navigable lakes and streams are likewise reserved 
to the state and shall be sold by the state land board 
only upon royalty basis. The amount of such 
royalties and the terms of such contracts shall be 
determined by the board; provided, that all such 
contracts shall be subject to the use of the waters 
for public purposes, and provided further that 
before executing a contract which contemplates 
the recovery of salts and minerals from said waters, 
the state land board shall require evidence that an 
application for the appropriation of water for such 
purpose has been filed with the state engineer and 
is pending in his office." 
The State of Utah claims that by virtue of the 
above quoted mineral reservation, it did not surrender 
the mineral deposits in the lands here involved at the time 
of the purported exchange with the United States. 
The claim of the defendants to the mineral deposits 
in the land arises as follows: It is claimed that the State 
of Utah surrendered its title to the United States in both 
the surface rights and the mineral deposits at the time of 
the purported exchange in the year 1925. Thereafter, the 
United States conveyed titled to the aforesaid property 
to the defendants' predecessor, Ira W. Hatch, by patent 
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dated January 3, 1937. This latter conveyance was the 
result of an exchange of lands between Ira W. Hatch 
and the United States under the Act of March 20, 1922, 
16 U.S.C. §485. Neither the patent from the United 
States to Ira W. Hatch nor the conveyance from Ira W. 
Hatch to the defendant, James L. Hatch, contained any 
reservation of mineral interest. 
There are no written instruments relating to the 
purported exchange of lands between the State of Utah 
and the United States other than the referred to Selection 
Lists of 1925 and the Approved List of 1928. The Lists 
are silent with respect to any mineral reservation or 
mineral conveyance. 
According to the uncontradicted testimony of Don-
ald G. Prince, Land Examiner of the Utah State Land 
Board, none of the selections included in the Selection 
Lists of 1925 had any tendency to compact the State's 
land holdings. None of the selected lieu lands were located 
either contiguous to or in the vicinity of other State 
owned lands. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN TRUST IN ITS GOV-
ERNMENTAL CAPACITY. 
POINT II. 
THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A RESERV-
ATIO·N OF MINERALS. 
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POINT III. 
UTAH LAW NECESSARILY CONTROLS THE 
QUESTION OF WHETHER THE STATE RELIN-
QUISHED THE MINERALS IN ITS SCHOOL 
LANDS. 
POINT! IV. 
THE EXCHANGE WAS ONE OF EQUIV A-
LENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SCHOOL SECTION LANDS ARE HELD BY 
THE STATE OF UTAH IN TRUST, IN ITS GOV-
ERNMENTAL CAPACITY. 
It is an admitted fact that the lands here involved, 
including the mineral deposits therein, were granted to 
the State of Utah for the support of its common schools 
under the Utah Enabling Act, and that title thereto 
vested in the State of Utah, upon approval of survey, 
which took place prior to May 24, 1897. An examination 
of the Enabling Act and the State Constitution make it 
clear that the school section grants are held by the State 
in its sovereign or governmental capacity, as distinguished 
from a proprietary capacity. 
Section 6 of the Enabling Act (28 Stat. 107) con-
tains the following language: 
((That upon the admission of said state into 
the Union, sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-
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8 
two and thirty-six in every township ... are 
hereby granted to said state for the support of 
common schools." 
Section 10, of the Enabling Act, reads in part: 
((That the proceeds of lands herein granted 
for educational purposes, except as hereinafter 
otherwise provided, shall constitute a permanent 
school fund, the interest of which only shall be 
expended for the support of said schools." 
Pertinent provisions of the State Constitution in-
clude Article XX, Section 1, as follows: 
((All lands of the state that have been, or may 
hereafter be granted to the state by Congress, and 
all lands acquired by gift, grant or devise, from 
any person or corporation, or that may otherwise 
be acquired, are hereby accepted and declared to 
be the public lands of the state; and shall be held 
in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may 
be provided by law, for the respective purposes 
for which they have been or may be granted, 
dona ted, devised or otherwise acquired." 
Article 10, Se.ction 3, of the State Constitution, provides 
that the proceeds of the sale of State lands and other lands 
granted for the support of common schools shall be and 
remain a perpetual fund, the interest only to be used. 
Section 5 of the same Article is substantially to the same 
effect, while Section 7 provides that all public school 
funds shall be guaranteed by the state against loss or 
diversion. 
The foregoing portions of the Enabling Act and of 
the State Constitution reveal an intent to impose upon 
the State a special trust and responsibility with respect 
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to school section grants. In the words of this Court, ((It 
must be conceded that these lands are held by the state 
in its governmental capacity and not otherwise." Van-
Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418, 442, 199 Pac. 670, 
679, and see Duchesne County, et al., v. State Tax Com-
mission, et al., 104 Utah 365, 372-383, 140 P. 2d 335, 
338-343. 
As stated in Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, supra, upon 
rehearing: 
((The Constitution declares that such lands 
cshall be held in trust for the people to be dis-
posed of as may be provided by law for the respec-
tive purposes for which they have been, or may 
be granted.' We emphasized [in the Court's ini-
tial opinion] the language just quoted, and stated 
that it was an (absolute limitation upon the power 
of the state to dispose of such lands, or permit 
them to be disposed of, except for the purposes 
for which they were granted by Congress.' We 
reaffirm what was there stated, for we find no 
reason to change our opinion. If there ever was 
a solemn declaration of trust made by a grantee 
of lands and published as such to all the world, 
it seems to us that this declaration is a perfect 
example. In view of the pledges, guaranties, as-
surances, and declarations of the Constitution, it 
must be conceded that these lands are held by the 
state in its governmental capacity and not other-
wise. When such is the case, ordinary statutes of 
limitations do not apply. To bring such lands 
within the operation of limitative statutes, it is 
extremely doubtful if anything short of an amend-
ment to the Constitution could effect the result . 
. . . " 58 Utah 442, 199 Pac. 679. 
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Since the State of Utah hold such lands in trust in 
its governmental .capacity, it necessarily follows that the 
State would not be bound by any unauthorized acts of 
its officers or agents in connection with the disposition of 
the lands. State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict, 51 N.M. 297, 183 P. 2d 607; Newton v. State Board 
of Land Commissioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053. 
In the same connection, federal courts have held that 
federal land officers are without power to effect sales and 
conveyances not specifically authorized by federal land 
laws. Price v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 267 U. S. 415, 45 
S. Ct. 312; St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 
U.S. 636; Doolan v. Carr, 125 U.S. 618; 8 S. Ct. 1228. 
Under the holding of the Van Wagoner case, the 
State would not be subject to such defenses as the statute 
of limitations, adverse possession, estoppel or waiver, ab-
sent specific State legislation to that effect. See also Pioneer 
Investment & Trust Company v. Board of Education, 35 
Utah 1, 99 Pac. 150; and State v. George C. Stafford & 
Sons, 99 N.H. 92, 105 A. 2d 569, 573. 
POINT II. 
THE UTAH STATUTES REQUIRE A RESERV-
ATION OF MINERALS. 
Since the constitution of the State of Utah provides 
that State lands can be disposed of only nas may be pro-
vided by law" (Article XX, Section 1), it becomes ap-
propriate to inquire what authority, if any, the State 
Land Board had to dispose of school section lands by an 
exchange arrangement with the United States. Such au-
thority necessarily must be found in applicable State 
statutes. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
What then is the statutory power conferred upon 
the State Land Board to dispose of state school sections 
by an exchange with the United States? The defendants 
have suggested that such power is: conferred by what are 
now Sections 65-1-27 and 65-1-70 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. But as will be herein demonstrated, 
these two sections are inapplicable. 
Sction 65-1-27 was first enacted in 1896. In 1925, 
at the time of the selections and exchange here involved, 
the statute read as· follows: 
((Sec. 55 8 0. Selections in legal subdivisions-
secure approval of U. S. Officers-cancellations, 
etc. All selections of land shall be made in legal 
subdivisions according to the United States survey, 
and when the selection has been made and approved 
by the land board, they shall take such action as 
shall be necessary to secure the approval of the 
proper officers of the United States, and the final 
transfer to this State of the lands selected. The 
land board is hereby empowered to cancel, relin-
quish, or release the claims of the State to, and to 
re-convey to the United States, any particular 
tract of land erroneously listed to the State, or any 
tract upon which, at the time of selection, a bona 
:fide .claim has been initiated by an actual settler." 
(Session Laws of Utah, 1925, Chapter 31, Section 
5580). 
The quoted provision has remained in substantially the 
same form up to the present time. The first sentence 
thereof appears to be merely directory. It directs the 
Land Board to take necessary action to secure the a p-
proval of the United States and the transfer to the State 
of lands to be selected. The Enabling Act, in addition to 
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granting the State four school sections in every town-
ship (Sec. 6), also granted the State many other lands 
in quantity or by way of indemnity (Sections 7, 8, 12). 
Many of these grants did not take effect nor did title 
vest until selections, according to United States surveys, 
were made by the State. The first sentence of Section 
65-1-27 is obviously a directory provision aimed at hasten-
ing this selection process. It does not refer in any sense 
to school section lands, title to which already had vested 
in the State. 
The second sentence of Section 5580 (now 65-1-27) 
is the empowering provision. It authorizes the Land 
Board to relinquish and reconvey to the United States 
tracts of land erroneously listed to the State or tracts 
upon a claim which has been initiated by a settler at the 
time of selection. The power of reconveyance is expressly 
limited to two situations, tracts erroneously listed and 
tracts where a settler has initiated a claim. No power 
to reconvey any other type of land is conferred. Cer-
tainly, no power to reconvey or exchange school sections 
in which title had vested in the State is conferred. 
The other state statute which the defendants suggest 
as conferring power upon the State Land Board is Sec-
tion 65-1-70, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. That statute 
was first enacted in 1897. In 1925, at the time of the 
selections and exchange here involved, it read as follows: 
Sec. 5618. To compact State land holdings-
exchanges, etc. In order to compact, as far as 
practicable, the land holdings of the State, the 
land board is hereby authorized to exchange any 
of the land held by the State for other land within 
the State held by other proprietors; and upon re-
quest of the land board the governor is hereby 
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13 
authorized to execute and deliver the necessary 
patents to such other proprietors and receive there-
from proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; pro-
vided, that no exchange shall be made by the land 
board until a patent for the land so received in 
exchange shall have been issued by the government 
of the United States to such proprietors or their 
grantors." (Session Laws of Utah, 1925, Chap. 31, 
sec. 5618) 
Except for minor amendments, this statute remained un-
changed until the 1933 Revised Statutes. At that time, 
the statute was amended to read: 
((86-1-58. Exchange of lands Between Board 
and Proprietors. In order to compact, as far as 
practicable, the land holdings of the state, the 
board is hereby authorized to exchange any of the 
land held by the state for other land of equal value 
within the state held by other proprietors; and 
upon request of the board the governor is hereby 
authorized to execute and deliver the necessary 
patents to such other proprietors and receive there-
from proper deeds of the lands so exchanged; pro-
vided, that no exchange shall be made by the 
land board until a patent for the land so received 
in exchange shall have been issued to such pro-
prietors or their grantors." (Revised Statutes, 1933, 
Section 86-1-58) 
The changes made in the 1933 Revised Statutes 
are indicated by italicizing above. As apparent, · the 
phrase ccof equal value" was inserted in the statute, and 
the phrase ccby the government of the United States" 
was deleted preceding the phrase ccto such proprietors or 
their grantors." 
Although Section 5618 (now 65-1-70) authorizes 
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certain exchanges of lands held by the State, it expressly 
limits such exchanges to situations where the United 
States has issued a patent on the lands to be received by 
the State in the exchange. The statute would seem, there-
fore, to refer to a private exchange between the State 
and a proprietor who has received a patent from the 
United States. In the context of the statute, the term 
uproprietor" obviously refers to some one other than the 
United States. Moreover, according to the statute itself, 
the purpose of the authorization to the State Land Board 
is {{in order to compact, as far as practicable, the land 
holdings of the state." It will be recalled that the un-
contradicted testimony of the plaintiffs' witness, Gale 
Prince, indicated that the exchange here involved had no 
tendency in any way to compact the State's holdings. 
Throughout, the statute speaks in terms of an exchange 
of deeds and patents on the part of both the State and 
of the proprietor with whom the exchange is to be 
effected. In the present case, as in all cases of selections 
and exchanges between the State and the United States, 
no deeds or patents are exchanged on either side. The 
en tire transaction consists of the selection lists and the 
approved list. It is submitted, therefore, that Section 5618 
(now Section 65-1-70) furnishes no authority to the State 
Land Board to dispose of State school section lands. 
The authority of the State Land Board - if authority 
exists - to enter into exchanges ·with the United States 
must stem from what is now known as Section 65-1-14, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The statute was first en-
acted in 1896, in substantially its present form. In 1925, 
its pertinent provision read as follows: 
uSee. 5575. Control of State lands-lease-sell, 
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etc.-reserve. The State Land Board shall have the 
direction, management and control of all lands 
heretofore or which may hereafter be granted to 
this State by the United States, or otherwise ... for 
any and all purposes whatsoever, ... and shall have 
the power to sell or lease the same for the best 
interests of the State and in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter and the constitution of 
this State .... " (1925 Session Laws of Utah, Chap. 
31, Sec. 5575) 
This provision, with additions not here material, 
exists today in substantially the same form. The some-
what broad powers conferred upon the State Land Board 
authority to direct, manage and control the lands granted 
to the State by the United States. As used in this statute 
((the power to sell" must be taken to include an exchange 
between the State and the federal government. Even 
though the decisions are not uniform, in similar situations 
courts frequently have held the term ((sell" or ((sale" to 
include an ((exchange." Newton v. State Board of Land 
Commissioners, et al., a37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053; Bridg-
forth v. Middleton, et al., 184 Miss. 632, 186 So. 837. And 
in Wyoming v. United States (1921), 255 U.S. 489, 497, 
41 S. Ct. 393, the Supreme Court referred to a similar 
selection and exchange between a state and the United 
States as the equivalent of a cash transaction. The Court 
said: 
(( ... Of course the State's right under the 
selection was precisely the same as if in 1912 it had 
made a cash entry of the selected land under an 
applicable statute, for the waiver of its right to 
the tract in the forest reserve was the equivalent 
of a cash consideration. And yet it hardly would 
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be suggested that the Commissioner or the secre-
tary on coming to consider the cash entry could 
do .otherwise than approve it, if at the time it was 
made the land was open to such an entry and the 
amount paid was the la·wful price." 
In this connection, it must be noted that the power 
of the State Land Board to nsell" under the authority 
of Section 5575 (now 65-1-14) is expressly limited by 
the requirement that it must be ((in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter and the constitution of this 
state." (1925 Session Laws, Chap. 31, Sec. 5575.) The 
very next section of this Chapter of the 1925 Session 
Laws, Section 5 575x, states: 
rrcoal and mineral lands reserved. All coal and 
other mineral deposits in lands belonging to the 
State are hereby reserved to the state. Such de-
posits are reserved from sale except upon a rental 
and royalty basis as herein provided and the pur-
chaser of any land belonging to the state shall 
acquire no right, title or interest in, or to such 
deposits, and the right of such purchaser shall be 
subject to the reservation. . . . " 
The foregoing provision has remained substantially the 
same since its first enactment on March 13, 1919. It is 
now known as Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. The statute constitutes an absolute and uncondi-
tional reservation in the State of all mineral deposits 
and an express prohibition against any attempt to alien-
ate such mineral deposits, except upon a rental or royalty 
basis. 
Clearly, Sections 5575 and 5575x (Sections 65-1-14 
and 65-1-15 of Utah Code Annotated, 1953) are in pari 
materia. They must be read and construed together. Just 
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as the term nsell" in Section 5575 must necessarily include 
an ((exchange," so also, the prohibition reserving minerals 
from ((sale" in Section 5575x must likewise apply to an 
((exchange." No other construction would be reasonable 
or in accord with the clear intent of the two sections. 
As hereinabove stated, a selection and exchange of 
surface lands with the United States must be effected 
by the State Land Board under the powers conferred 
by Section 5575, rather than Sections 5580 or 5618. But 
even if the plaintiff should be mistaken as to this, the 
fact still remains that any disposition of school section 
lands under Sections 55 8 0 or 5 618 of the same Chapter 3 1 
would be subject to the express mineral reservation of 
Section 5575x, to the same extent as Section 5575 is 
subject to that reservation. 
POINT III. 
UTAH LAW NECESSARILY CONTROLS THE 
QUESTIO·N O·F WHETHER THE STATE RELIN-
QUISHED THE MINERALS IN ITS SCHOOL 
LANDS. 
Defendants concede that the fee simple title to the 
subject lands vested completely in the State of Utah 
prior to May 24, 1897. Although conceding this im-
portant fact, defendants apparently argue that the fed-
eral law controls the transaction. The question which 
defendants do not answer, however, is how the .jurisdiction 
of the federal government re-attached to the subject 
lands when clearly such jurisdiction ceased and terminated 
prior to May 24, 1897. The decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States hold with clarity that when 
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title to school lands once vests in a state the jurisdiction 
of the United States ceases with respect thereto. In 
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 Howard 173, and Alabama v. 
Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 34 S. Ct. 301, the Supreme Court 
held that the state had full authority to subject vested 
school lands to the ordinary incidents of other titles in 
the state. 
An excellent discussion of this question is contained 
in the decision in United States vs. Fox, 94 U. S. 315, 24 
L. Ed. 192, in which the Court stated: 
uThe power of the State to regulate the tenure 
of real property within her limits, and the modes 
of its acquisition and transfer, and the rules of 
its descent, and the extent to which a testamentary 
disposition of it may be exercised by its owners, 
is undoubted. It is an established principle of law, 
everywhere recognized, arising from the necessity 
of the case, that the disposition of immovable 
property, whether by deed, descent, or any other 
mode, is exclusively subject to the government 
within whose jurisdiction the property is situated. 
McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 192, 202, 6 
L. Ed. 300. The power of the State in this respect 
follows from her sovereignty within her limits, 
as to all matters over which jurisdiction has not 
been expressly or by necessary implication trans-
ferred to the Federal government. The title and 
modes of disposition of real property within the 
State, whether into vivos or testamentary, are not 
matters placed under the control of Federal au-
thority. Such control would be foreign to the 
purposes for which the Federal government was 
created, and would seriously embarrass the landed 
interests of the State." 
In State of California vs. Deseret W atcr, Oil mul 
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Irrigation Company, 243 U. S. 415, the Supreme Court 
of the United States, although holding that a state might 
waive its rights in school lands in an exchange with 
United States, expressly stated: 
((With the state questions we have no concern, 
their ultimate solution being a matter for that 
court." 
In other words the Supreme Court held that the 
question of whether the state had by proper authority 
effected a waiver of its mineral rights in school lands 
was a question of state, not federal law. 
The identical problem was presented to the Supreme 
Court of Idaho in N ew'ton vs. State Board of Land Com-
missioners, et al., 37 Idaho 58, 219 Pac. 1053. That case 
involved the issue of whether the State Board of Land 
Commissioners had authority to exchange state owned 
school sections with the United States in the face of a 
requirement of the Idaho Admissions Bill that school 
section lands should be ((disposed of only at public sale" 
and a state constitutional provision prohibiting the sale of 
school sections ufor less than ten dollars per acre." The 
contention was made that the State Board's authority to 
enter into an exchange was derived from Sections 851 and 
852, Title 43, United States Code. In disposing of this 
argument, the Idaho Supreme Court carefully reviewed 
and analyzed the Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Co. case, 
both the opinion of the United States Supreme Court 
and the opinion of the California State Supreme Court 
(167 Cal. 147, 138 Pac. 981). The Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded that the federal statute was no more than 
permissive and did not touch upon the question of state 
law or authority. As stated in its opinion: 
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((Clearly the foregoing opinion [of the United 
States Supreme] does not go further than to 
hold that sections 2275 and 2276, Rev. Stats. U.S., 
confer upon a state the right to receive indemnity 
lands for school sections 16 and 3 6 to which it has 
a complete and indefeasible title, upon its surrender 
of such lands to the government, and that its 
reinvestment of title in the government operates 
to waive its rights as to such land and take title 
to the indemnity lands. But as we understand 
the decision, the Federal Supreme Court expressly 
disavows any purpose to decide for the state when 
and under what circumstances it has authority 
under its Constitution and laws to surrender such 
school lands, which is the question before us for 
determination. . . . " 
::- * * 
uit is clear that the federal Supreme Court in 
California v. Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Co., 
supra, in construing said sections 2275 and 2276 
of the United States Revised Statutes, as these sec-
tions were amended in 1891, subsequent to the pas-
sage of the Idaho Admission Bill, held that Con-
gress has authorized the government to consent to 
such exchange, but it has not undertaken therein 
or elsewhere to say that these provisions of the 
statute go farther than to be permissive. As in 
that opinion declared, the question as to whether 
or not the state under its Constitution and laws 
has authority to make such exchange is one for 
the ultimate decision of the state's courts. This 
court is bound by the plain provisions of the Con-
stitutional provision, which clearly and lmmistak-
ably prohibits such an exchange. We therefore 
hold that the state board of land commissioners 
is without authority to effect such proposed ex-
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change with the government of the United States, 
and that any action that it has taken or may at-
tempt to take to carry out this exchange is con-
trary to the Constitution and null and void." 
Again in United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 Fed. 2d 
1003, (CCA 5th 1951) it was held that the law of the 
State of Louisiana controlled the question of whether a 
Louisiana statute of prescription applied with respect to 
a transaction whereby Louisiana lands were sold to the 
United States of America for national forest purposes. 
And in Los Angeles and Salt LakeR. Co. v. U. S., 140 
Fed. 2d 43 5 (CCA 9th 1944) it was held that the law 
of the State of California governed in determining wheth-
er a deed from the State of California to the United States 
conveyed the mineral rights in state land. 
Other cases in which federal courts have applied 
state law in transactions involving the United States of 
America are: U. S. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 
318 U.S. 206, 63 S. Ct. 534; The Choctaw and Chicasaw 
Nations v. Wilmer D. Ceay, et al., 235 Fed. 2d 31 (CCA 
lOth 1956); U. S. v. Champlin Refining Co., et al., 156 
Fed. 2d 769, affirmed 331 U. S. 788, 67 S. Ct. 1346. 
POINT IV. 
THE EXCHANGE WAS ONE OF EQUIV A-
LENTS. 
The defendants argue that an exchange between the 
United States and the State of Utah, in which the State 
conveyed only surface rights to the lands it offered, would 
not be a valid exchange of ((equivalents" as contemplated 
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by applicable federal laws. Wyoming v. United States 
(1920), 255 U. S. 489, 502. According to defendants, 
since the lieu lands selected and received by the State 
from the United States contained no mineral reservation 
and the base lands surrendered by the State were subject 
to a mineral reservation, there was no quid pro quo. 
The fallacy of this argument is that the State was 
permitted under the federal statute to make lieu selections 
only of non-mineral lands. Revised Statutes, Section 2276 
(now 43 U.S.C. §852) provides that the selections by 
the State shall be ((not mineral in character." cf. United 
States v. Sweet, (1918) 245 U. S. 563. Moreover, as 
demonstrated by the certificate of the Commissioner of 
General Land Office of the Department of Interior at-
tached to and made a part of the Approved List 156 
(Exhibit ((C"), a specific finding as to the ttnon-mineral 
character" of the selected land is made by the Department 
of Interior when the Approved List is issued and certified. 
In an exchange between the United States and the 
State, the intention of the United States is to give the 
State only non-mineral lands in exchange for the school 
sections surrendered as base. A mineral reservation in 
the State, of lands to be surrendered, merely tends to 
make the exchange, in truth, an exchange of ((equivalents." 
The mere fact that many years later the selected lands 
may prove to be valuable for minerals, and the State 
thereby acquires a windfall, does not change the nature 
of the exchange when made. At the time of the exchange, 
the State surrender lands, with a mineral reservation in 
the State. The United States grants to the State, lands 
non-mineral in character. In every sense of the word 
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there is a quid pro quo exchange of equivalents on bo~h 
sides. The transaction must be considered as of the date 
of the said exchange. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Plaintiff was en-
titled to a judgment quieting its title to the mineral de-
posits in the lands described in the complaint. 
It is an admitted fact that title to both the surface 
rights and the mineral deposits in the subject lands fully 
vested in the State of Utah prior to the time of the 
purported exchange of these lands with the United States 
in 1925. It also is an admitted fact that at that time 
there was in full force and effect a Utah law under which 
((all coal and other minerals deposited in lands belonging 
to the State of Utah are hereby reserved to the State." 
(Section 65-1-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) This 
reservation is absolute and unqualified. It constitutes a 
complete barrier to any attempt or purported action of 
any agent or official of the State to dispose of minerals 
in State owned lands, except on a rental and royalty basis, 
as specified by the State law. 
Since the school section lands are held by the State 
in trust, in its governmental capacity, they can be dis-
posed of only as expressly authorized by law. In its gov-
ernmental capacity the State is not subject to the usual 
defenses of waiver, estoppel or laches. The mineral de-
posits in all State owned school lands are intended for 
the benefit of all the citizens of the State, and for the 
express purpose of supporting the state schools. It must 
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be presumed that the United States took these school 
lands with full knowledge of this fact. 
On the basis of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully 
urges that the judgment below be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, JR. 
ATTO·RNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
DENNIS McCARTHY, Special Assistant 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF UTAH 
Counsel for Appellant 
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